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What is Dialectical Philosophy of Mathematics?1 
The late Imre Lakatos once hoped to found a school of dialectical philosophy of 
mathematics.2  The aim of this paper is to ask what that might possibly mean.  However, 
Lakatos’ own philosophy comes dressed in Popperian clothes.  Mathematics, in his work, is 
driven along by counterexamples to conjectured theorems.  Admittedly he swiftly moves from 
strictly logical counterexamples to ‘heuristic’ ones.3  A ‘heuristic’ counterexample is an object 
or phenomenon which, while not strictly inconsistent with the theorem in hand, nevertheless 
indicates some shortcoming in it (such as a lack of generality or explanatory power).  Perhaps 
Lakatos intended this transition from logical to heuristic counterexamples as a sort of bridge 
from a simple Popperian picture of progress in mathematics to a more richly dialectical 
conception.  Here though he suffers from the difficulty that even Popper did not take a 
‘Popperian’ view of mathematics.  Rhetorical subtleties aside, Lakatos is associated with the 
superficially exciting claim that mathematics suffers refutations and revolutions akin to those 
found in the history of the physical sciences.  To extend and develop his work is (it seems) to 
search the history of mathematics for refutations, or at least for items that might by some 
stretch of language count as ‘falsifiers’.  Refutations turn out to be rare in general and almost 
non-existent in twentieth-century mathematics.  Of course, more sympathetic readings find a 
richer, more Hungarian Lakatos hiding beneath the Popperian gloss.4  However, exploring 
these readings raises the danger that the task of getting Lakatos right may displace that of 
developing a philosophical understanding of mathematics itself. 
 Some scholars look to Lakatos’ work on the physical sciences to guide us in extending 
and developing his philosophy of mathematics.  This, though, suffers from a related drawback.  
His ‘methodology of scientific research programmes’ shares the ambition common to all forms 
of demarcationism.  This aim was to articulate a universal standard for the evaluation of 
scientific work, valid at all times and in all places.  If we once admit this goal, then we 
inevitably find ourselves side-tracked into an argument about the very possibility of such an 
ahistorical definition of ‘good science’.  That debate absorbed the energies of many 
philosophers of science.  There is no obvious benefit in revisiting it in the philosophy of 
mathematics.  Moreover, a demarcationist ‘methodology’ of science is, necessarily, topic-
neutral.  It must be able to decide the scientific status of any sort of enquiry.  Its criteria must 
apply to Newton and Marx, to Freud and Einstein.  I shall argue below that such highly general 
methodological models are at best blunt instruments for understanding patterns of thought 
proper to mathematics. 
 None of this is to deny that Lakatos is a hugely important figure in the philosophy of 
mathematics.  But his importance does not lie in his fallibilism (which turns out to be quite 
innocuous once the Popperian paint is peeled off).  His significance lies, rather, in having 
turned philosophical attention to what one might call the ‘inner life’ of mathematics.  For most 
of the twentieth century epistemologists of mathematics have assumed a ‘deductivist’ model of 
mathematical argument.  On this view the sole point of a mathematical proof is to derive the 
desired theorem from explicitly stated premises.  The philosophy of mathematics has, 
consequently, been dominated by deductive logic.  More to the point, it has been dominated by 
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formal logic—that is, logic in which the content of an argument plays no role in the inference, 
which is carried entirely by the argument form.  Philosophical programmes that concentrate on 
formal logic inevitably lose touch with the content of the arguments they set out to understand.  
That sort of work has its philosophical merits, and formal logic is of course a worthwhile 
branch of mathematics in its own right.5  Nevertheless the mainstream English-speaking 
tradition leaves interesting philosophical questions unasked.  Lakatos’ unfulfilled wish enjoins 
us to find dialectical ways of asking them without reproducing his shortcomings. 
The Dialectical Philosopher 
 Suppose we accept, for the sake of argument, that the sole point of a mathematical 
proof is to derive a theorem from freely accepted premises by deductively valid steps.  Suppose 
further (which is not the case) that there is no controversy about the logical system into which 
mathematical proofs are to be formalised.  We may still reasonably enquire how the premises 
for proofs are chosen.  Why should mathematicians explore the deductive closure of this set of 
axioms rather than that? 
 It might be argued that this question has no philosophical significance.  Mathematicians 
are free to choose any consistent set of axioms they please.  Since consistency is the only 
constraint, the choice must be a matter of subjective preference and is therefore 
philosophically uninteresting.  However, mathematicians do not settle on sets of axioms just 
because they like the look of them.  They do not feel themselves to be constrained by 
consistency alone.  When they evaluate a piece of research they are not satisfied with the 
information that all the theorems have been validly deduced from consistent premises.  Some 
work is judged important, some trivial, some promising, some not, and so forth.  These 
judgments are sometimes contested and then there may be an exchange of reason-giving.  
Evangelists for category theory, for example, see in it other virtues in addition to consistency.  
Reasoned evaluation is not arbitrary, even if it has a subjective element to it.  It is of course 
possible to re-describe these choices in entirely sociological or psychological terms, but to do 
that is to give up philosophy in favour of social science.6  It is to abandon the inside-
phenomenological stance for the outside-observer position. 
 We can now begin to characterise dialectical philosophy of mathematics.  The task is a 
little delicate because the word ‘dialectical’ has a long history and has acquired some notoriety.  
First, the dialectical philosopher of mathematics adopts what I have just called the ‘inside-
phenomenological stance’.  Do not let the word ‘phenomenological’ mislead you.  This is not a 
study of what it feels like to do mathematics.  The phenomenologist takes up a point of view 
and studies its logical constitution as it were ‘from the inside’.  But we are not concerned with 
the individual mathematician.  We are interested in the ‘point of view’ belonging to 
mathematics itself.  This way of speaking is of course analogical.  Mathematics has no 
subjectivity in the proper sense.  It feels neither joy nor pain.  Nevertheless, the analogy is not 
mysterious.  We can say that the theory of projectile motion is ‘blind’ to the ethical difference 
between a distress flare and an assassin’s bullet (though theorists are not).  There is no mystery 
in the remark that analysis was ‘conflicted’ over the rival versions of the early calculus (though 
individual mathematicians clearly supported one over the other).  Thus the sense of 
‘phenomenological’ in play here is something like that in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.7  
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The point of the inside-phenomenological stance is to insist that changes in the body of 
mathematics normally take place for mathematical reasons.  The dialectical philosopher 
assumes the rationality and integrity of mathematical inquiry just as the humanist philosopher 
assumes the rationality and integrity of human subjects (‘integrity’ here means the stability and 
coherence that allow us to speak of the character of this person or that sub-field).  These 
assumptions are, of course, qualified by the influence of historical and environmental factors—
neither people nor fields of mathematical research can entirely escape the conditions under 
which they grow up.  Statistics, for example, could not develop until there were organisations 
with an interest in gathering large bodies of standardised data.  Similarly, it is hard to see how 
the study of strange attractors could have preceded the computer age.  Moreover the rationality 
and integrity assumptions are defeasible in particular cases.  Human beings sometimes suffer 
delusions, or dementia.  Analogously, mathematical development may be distorted by 
ideological interference, stymied by academic rivalries or halted by the fall of empires.  
Nevertheless, the default position is that the direction of mathematical development and the 
response of mathematics to external stimuli are both best explained by factors proper to 
mathematics itself. 
To switch vocabulary for a moment, the dialectical philosopher of mathematics insists 
on the possibility of ‘internal history’.  Now, the distinction between internal and external 
history cannot be made with the clarity that Lakatos hoped for.  Aside from the defeasibility of 
internalist assumptions, the fact is that much historical material could fit equally well into 
either internalist or externalist stories.  For example, “Soon after Wiles gave his proof, an error 
was spotted and he had to withdraw it.”  This sentence could be found equally well in an 
analysis of the grid/group structure of the mathematical community or in a rationally-
reconstructed case-study.  However, dialectical philosophy does not require a sharp distinction 
between internal and external factors because it does not share the logical positivist and 
Popperian horror of ‘psychologism’.  In Popper this determination to insulate science from the 
human foibles of scientists produced the absurd notion of ‘knowledge without a knowing 
subject’.  Dialectical philosophy, in contrast, typically recognises that human minds, however 
fallible, are the only available vehicles for the greater rationality of science.  All that the 
dialectical philosopher need insist on is that the general direction of a historical development is 
best explained by an analysis of the concepts governing that development.  This assumption 
may be implausible in military, political or economic history, but it is in just this respect that 
science and mathematics differ from most other human activities. 
 Notice that the object of study is mathematical development rather than truth or 
validity.  Human rationality reveals itself in speech and action.  It is not a tenseless state that 
can be inspected without reference to time and change.  Similarly, the dialectical philosopher 
of mathematics seeks rationality and integrity in the development of mathematics.  Does the 
mathematical community reach the right choices for the right reasons?  Remember we noticed 
that even on a deductivist picture of mathematical argument it is necessary to choose the 
axioms.  Real mathematicians have to choose problems, techniques and proof-strategies.  The 
mathematical community has to decide when to treat a result as proven and worthy of 
celebration.  These choices (to reiterate) are neither arbitrary nor ‘simply subjective’.  They 
are, however, time-bound.  I choose a problem now in the belief that it will be fruitful in the 
future.  The community declares a theorem proven, confident that it will not have to withdraw 
that status later.  When a result is judged to be significant, it is deemed to have staying power. 
 Clearly the dialectical philosophy of mathematics sketched here owes something to 
Hegel.  This debt is compatible with the spirit of Lakatos, who named Hegel as one of the three 
‘ideological sources’ of the Ph.D. thesis that eventually became Proofs and Refutations.8  
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Nevertheless one may reasonably worry that the present project might inherit some of Hegel’s 
shortcomings.  Does it require actually-existing contradictions?  What of the unity of 
opposites?  The transformation of quantity into quality?  The famous negation of the negation? 
We must of course endeavour to learn what we can from Hegel, but his view suffers from such 
severe defects that we should not be tempted to adopt it wholesale.  Let us see what can be 
salvaged. 
 What is correct in Hegel is the thought that dialectic principally concerns concepts 
rather than propositions.  Formal logic requires terms to keep the same meaning from the 
beginning of an argument to the end.  Otherwise the argument falls into the fallacy of 
equivocation.  (Remember that a formal argument is one in which the non-logical content plays 
no role in the inference.  This indifference to content is only possible so long as the non-logical 
terms are fixed.)  In a dialectical argument, however, the meanings of the central terms develop 
as the argument uncovers defects in the primitive concepts with which the question in hand 
was first posed.  ‘Justice’ means something quite different at the end of Plato’s Republic than it 
did at the beginning.  This distinction between the formal logic of propositions and the 
dialectical logic of concepts is obscure in Hegel for two reasons.  First, in his day the only 
formal logic was the categorical syllogistic.  Therefore it seemed that all logic deals with 
relations between categories; in formal logic the categories are fixed, whereas in dialectical 
logic they are permitted to develop.  Second, a typical Hegelian concept is so rich and 
internally complex that perhaps ‘conception’ would be a better translation of Hegel’s Begriff 
than the more modest ‘concept’ (some translations side-step this ambiguity by rendering 
Begriff as ‘notion’).  Nevertheless, Hegel understood that formal and dialectical logic are 
strictly incompatible.  What is fallacious in the former is the very point of the latter.  Indeed, 
his determination to keep them apart is the source of his undoing.  He attempted to produce a 
pure dialectic in which each stage in the development of a concept gives rise to its successor 
without the concept-term ever appearing in a sequence of propositions.  The famous slogans 
(the unity of opposites, the transformation of quantity into quality, and the negation of the 
negation) are Hegel’s attempt to explain how to get from concept to concept (or from concept-
stage to concept-stage) without invoking any formal logic.9 
 Hegel’s thought here is entirely reasonable—formal and dialectical logics have 
different aims and incompatible standards of rigour, so we ought not to mix them up.  
However, concepts only come to life when they are used in propositions.  Hypotheses—not 
concepts—are vulnerable to counterexamples.  Theories may be faulted for a lack of scope or 
explanatory capacity, but concepts (strictly speaking) may not.  A concept remains inert if it is 
not put to work in a conjecture, theory, theorem-candidate or proof.  Where the dialectical 
transitions in Hegel are obscure and unconvincing, it is I think for this reason, that he tries to 
get from concept to concept without the terms in question figuring in propositions.  This leads 
him into the category-error of asking whether a given concept is true.  Sometimes Hegel’s 
dialectical stories do make sense, but in most of these cases the ‘concepts’ in play are so rich 
that they are more like models or theories.  Such ‘conceptions’ are normally conceptions of 
something specific, and may therefore be assessed for accuracy.  In such cases Hegel evades 
the charge of category confusion.  On this point Lakatos has the advantage over Hegel.  In 
Proofs and Refutations the dialectical development of concepts is structured and motivated by 
the effort to prove a theorem.  The formal logic of propositions and the dialectical logic of 
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concepts are both necessary if a field is to develop (Lakatos calls them language-statics and 
language-dynamics respectively10).  They are in tension, since formal logic is conceptually 
conservative while dialectical logic is innovative, but this tension is proper to any intellectual 
discipline.11  We have already noted that Lakatos’ view is excessively Popperian, and that the 
patterns in Proofs and Refutations are not readily found in twentieth-century mathematics.  
Nevertheless on this point—the necessary inter-penetration of formal and dialectical logics—
he is correct. 
 So far, then, our dialectical philosopher tracks the development of mathematics from 
the inside in the sense described above.  He or she is especially interested in the emergence of 
new concepts.  This in turn leads to a concern with the evaluative discourse of mathematicians.  
We hope to tease out the grounds on which a body of research is said to be deep, fruitful, 
promising, trivial or sterile.  We do this with no specific dialectical model in hand.  The 
ambition is to describe the rationale of mathematical research as we find it, rather than to press 
it into some pre-formed mould.  The dialectical philosopher is, in this sense, a methodological 
anarchist. 
 The final point in this description of the dialectical philosopher of mathematics is as 
follows: he or she has nothing to say about the ultimate ontological status of mathematics or its 
objects.  Whether we adopt fictionalism; or embrace a kind of emergentism in which 
mathematics produces itself out of the activities of mathematicians; or whether we think of 
progress as ever-closer approximation to a pre-existing Platonic reality, makes no difference to 
our study of the inner logic of mathematical development.  The dialectical stories turn out the 
same regardless of any ontological commitment.  Of course, mathematicians may hold 
metaphysical views which affect the development of the discipline, but this is part of what the 
dialectical philosopher hopes to understand.  Since the dialectical stories are not altered by 
anterior ontological constraints, the dialectical philosopher has no criteria for choosing 
between ontological doctrines.  This is part of the motive for introducing the term 
‘phenomenology’.  In its own way the phenomenological tradition is as sceptical as empiricism 
about the possibility of ‘ultimate’ metaphysical knowledge.  It is possible, in phenomenology, 
to do ‘relative metaphysics’ i.e. to compare the presuppositions of one area of human life with 
another.  Mathematics is a tool for physical science as well as a study in its own right.  We can 
compare the metaphysical features of empirical and mathematical objects, since this contrast 
occurs within human experience.  What we cannot do, as phenomenologists, is to make claims 
about the world beyond our experience (reading the word ‘experience’ more widely than is 
usual in the empiricist tradition).12  Hence, the programme here outlined may attract those who 
still feel that there is something illegitimate about ontological questions but who cannot accept 
the empiricist diagnosis.  It will, for the same reason, repel those who believe that ontological 
questions are indispensable to philosophy. 
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Cases 
 So far we have a programmatic description of the dialectical philosopher of 
mathematics.  But does this animal exist in nature?  At best it is bound to be rare because, first, 
a dialectical philosopher of mathematics must be a philosopher.  In particular he or she must 
understand the history of philosophy well enough to see how the programme described here 
differs from other philosophical approaches to mathematics.  Otherwise, one could not steer 
one’s own research, and would have little to contribute that could not come from a thoughtful 
mathematician.13  In addition, one must master some serious mathematics, especially if one 
proposes to work on twentieth century material (though it is not necessary to have done 
mathematical research oneself).  Moreover, one would hope to exercise some discretion in 
selecting cases for study.  Proofs and Refutations is often criticised on the grounds that the 
Descartes-Euler conjecture is a singular case.  No other theorem, it is said, developed in quite 
that way.  We need not now explore whether this charge against Lakatos is justified.  The point 
is that in order to avoid this criticism one must choose cases that are in some way 
representative.  That requires a broad overview of mathematics and its recent history. 
A few figures from the recent history of philosophy embody some of the features I have 
described, such as Cavaillès, Hadamard or Pólya.  However, to be forward-looking I have 
selected three living philosophers to illustrate the general case.14  None of these has, to my 
knowledge, used the terms ‘dialectical’ or ‘phenomenological’ to describe themselves (but 
none objected to an earlier draft of this paper). 
Yehuda Rav: Why do we prove theorems? 
 In the spring of 1999 Yehuda Rav, a mathematician at the University of Paris, 
published an article entitled ‘Why do we prove theorems?’ (Philosophia Mathematica vol. 7 
part 1 Feb. 1999 pp. 5-41).  He proposes a thought-experiment.  Suppose that a machine called 
‘Pythiagora’ were built that answers mathematical questions instantaneously and accurately 
(this fantasy obviously requires us to ignore some well-known results in formal logic).  Instead 
of having to wait for human mathematicians to settle the Goldbach conjecture, we can just ask 
Pythiagora.  Immediately the answer will flash back: ‘true’ or ‘false’ accordingly.  What we do 
not get is a proof.  If the function of proofs is solely epistemic, then we are no worse off, since 
we know (somehow) that Pythiagora never makes a mistake.  The task of Rav’s article is to 
argue by examples that proofs do a lot more than merely to confer certainty on theorems.  His 
examples are richly diverse and mostly drawn from the twentieth century. 
 Rav’s first cases restate a thought familiar from Pólya and Lakatos: failed proofs can 
lead to unforeseen theorems.  Work on the Goldbach Conjecture led to a host of results in 
number theory and related fields (Rav gives a list on pp. 7-8).  Of course, we could have got all 
this extra information from Pythiagora.  However, many of the theorems discovered in the 
course of trying to decide the Goldbach Conjecture give answers to questions that no-one is 
likely to have thought of otherwise.  Rav offers the Continuum Hypothesis as further 
illustration of this point.  The Continuum Hypothesis is, like the Goldbach Conjecture, 
undecided so far.15  Unlike the Goldbach Conjecture, which seems to be something of a logical 
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 Thus far, Rav restates and elaborates the case against deductivism.  He goes on to argue 
(by giving instances) that very little mature modern mathematics could be formally 
axiomatised, even in principle.  Thus he opposes the common view that mathematicians would 
be able to present their proofs as derivations from explicitly-stated axioms within a specified 
formal system, but for the length of the resulting papers.  Mathematicians could not express 
their proofs in a formal logical system even if they wished to because mathematical arguments 
are not merely formal (in the sense explained above of indifference to non-logical content).  
That (argues Rav, p. 13) is why mathematical papers are so hard to read even when one has 
studied logic.  The inferences appeal to features of the non-logical content, which is why one 
has to understand so much background material in order to grasp a mathematical argument.  If 
the inferences of mathematical proofs were carried entirely by topic-neutral logic then one 
could check their validity easily (though without knowing what had been proved). 
The case is worth making because deductivism is alive and well even among 
mathematicians.  In the recent ‘math wars’ over the nature of proof the conservative tendency 
sometimes articulated their account of mathematical rigour in deductivist terms.16  However, 
Rav’s treatment of the Goldbach Conjecture and the Continuum Hypothesis contains a thought 
that is not found explicitly in Pólya or Lakatos.  It is this: proofs contain important 
mathematical elements that are not passed on to the theorems they establish, namely, methods.  
For example, Rav reports that the assault on the Goldbach Conjecture led to the development 
of sieve methods.  These techniques turned out to have wide application and are a significant 
piece of mathematical know-how.  Another example, this one not given by Rav, would be 
diagonalisation.  This device allows us to prove that the continuum is non-denumerable.  
Having seen the trick, we can use it again to prove that interesting subsets of the continuum 
(such as Cantor’s dust) are also non-denumerable.  Tarski and Gödel later used modified forms 
of diagonalisation in proofs of some of their most famous results.  Rav offers further examples: 
the usual proof of the infinity of primes assumes that there are finitely many primes, p1, p2,… 
pn.  The trick is to form the product of these primes and add one.  The resulting number 
(p1p2…pn+1) cannot be composite since it is not divisible by any of the primes p1, p2,… pn.  On 
the other hand it cannot be a prime since ex hypothesi we have all the primes already.  So our 
original claim to have enumerated all the primes must be false.  This familiar technique can be 
extended (for example to prove that there are infinitely many primes of the form 4n+3).  
Another of Rav’s examples is Lagrange’s theorem that the order of a finite group is divided by 
the order of any of its subgroups.  To prove this result we have to consider the cosets of the 
subgroup.  Cosets do not appear in the statement of the theorem.  Yet the coset-technique is 
perhaps as important as the theorem itself, since it turns out to be a powerful research tool. 
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 “Proofs” Rav concludes, “contain significant topic-specific information going beyond 
the statement incorporated into the formulation of the theorem.  Or to speak metaphorically, 
theorems are the headlines, proofs are the inside story” (p. 22).  Notice that Rav’s methods are 
quite different from Lakatos’ methods.  Constructing cosets is a typical Rav-type method, 
while Lakatos-type methods are relatively topic-neutral patterns such as lemma-incorporation 
or monster-adjustment.  Recall our earlier observation that demarcationist criteria must apply 
to any inquiry or argument whatsoever.  The patterns found in Proofs and Refutations are 
logical—or if we prefer, ‘methodological’ in the philosophy of science sense.  One can 
imagine subjecting a legal argument to proof-analysis and incorporating its lemmas as 
conditions.  Indeed, a cynic might think that practical jurisprudence consists almost entirely of 
monster-adjustment to bring hard cases within the meaning of the act.  Be that as it may, the 
point is that we can intelligibly harbour such thoughts because Lakatos’ patterns are not 
specific to mathematics.  It is not self-evidently absurd to go looking for them in non-
mathematical contexts such as the law.  Methods in Rav’s sense, by contrast, are distinctively 
mathematical.  Diagonalisation, sieve methods and coset-construction are unlikely to find 
direct employment outside mathematics.  It is precisely because these methods are properly 
mathematical that the development of a new one counts as a significant mathematical 
achievement in its own right.17 
 Before we count Rav as a card-carrying dialectical philosopher of mathematics, we 
should note a limitation to the range of his philosophical data.  In the article cited here at least, 
he restricts himself to published proofs, that is, to proofs in their final, polished forms.  This 
allows him to rove freely across widely diverse fields of mathematics because he only needs to 
consult journals.  He need not spend months poring over private correspondence or negotiating 
access to this or that literary estate.  His conclusions gain great stability from this broad 
evidential base.  However, this restriction exposes him to certain dangers.  The first is the cult 
of genius.  Rav notes (correctly) that the employment of research methods such as those 
already mentioned could never be derived by topic-neutral logic from the conditions of the 
theorem to be proved.  Their development and use is, he says, therefore creative.  This term is 
unobjectionable provided that it is not offered as an explanation for the emergence of the 
technique in question.  We expect even the most novel technique to have some sort of 
rationale.  For the dialectical tradition in philosophy, an appeal to individual creative genius 
does not explain an intellectual event any more than talk of magic can explain a material one.  
We are not content to chronicle the development of mathematics; rather we hope to understand 
it.  Consequently we will wish to dig behind the proof in search of the intimations, prototypes, 
false starts and significant clues that led up to the advent of some given mathematical 
technique.  This material is not normally included in the final published version, in spite of 
Lakatos’ proposal that mathematicians adopt his ‘heuristic style’ of presentation.  I do not say 
that Rav himself has fallen into the cult of genius, only that in restricting oneself to published 
documents, one exposes oneself to it.18  As a practising mathematician Rav must see behind 
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some tricks grow up to be theories.  For example, considering permutations of roots began as a proof-strategy; the 
Galois correspondence is a theorem; finally we have a body of knowledge called ‘Galois theory’. 
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 Romantics may complain that there must be a place for genius in our picture of mathematical practice.  It 
depends on what the question is.  Newton’s genius cannot explain why he produced a version of the calculus, 
since Newton born into ancient Egypt or Mesopotamia would have applied his talents to the mathematics he found 
already in existence.  On the other hand, if we wish to know why it was Newton rather than Barrow or Wallis who 
developed the calculus, then personal talent may be part of the answer. 
the scenes and is hardly likely to forget that the production of a proof is usually a long-drawn-
out process. 
 The second danger in looking at published documents only is that we may overlook 
what (following Polanyi) we may call the ‘tacit dimension’ in mathematical research.  All 
human activity involves some sort of inarticulate know-how.  At the most basic level, we are 
able to control fine movements in our limbs without being able to explain how.  Those 
mechanics who work on the same sort of engine for a long time develop a hands-on feel that 
cannot be replicated in manuals.  In empirical science researchers accumulate experience 
which guides them when explicitly-stated methods let them down.  Many experiments produce 
unexpected results, but few of these indicate novel phenomena; most of them are just 
malfunctions.  An experimenter needs a nose for relevance if every stray datum is not to 
produce a wild goose chase.  In mathematics there is not normally anything physical to 
manipulate, but mathematicians do develop inarticulate intuitions which guide their judgments 
both in steering their own research and in evaluating that of others.  The professional 
judgment-call has hardly ever been studied in philosophy of mathematics.  We cannot hope to 
repair that lacuna if we restrict ourselves to publicly-available sources.  Here again, Rav 
himself has the advantage of being a working mathematician—the danger is more acute for 
philosophers hoping to follow his lead. 
Mary Leng: Participant-Observer Studies 
 These anxieties (associated with the study of published documents only) lead to a piece 
of work by Mary Leng of the University of Toronto.  She set out to see whether the picture of 
mathematical progress given in Proofs and Refutations has any application in contemporary 
pure mathematics.  To this end she attended a seminar series given by Professor George Elliott 
on “The Structure of C*-algebras” at the Toronto Fields Institute for Research in the 
Mathematical Sciences in the Spring term of 1998.  Elliott was trying to develop a 
classification theorem for some suitably well-behaved class of these objects and the graduate 
students enjoyed a weekly update on his efforts.  Detailed consideration of Leng’s results 
would require detailed consideration of C*-algebras.  Her approach is in a way the converse of 
Rav’s.  Where Rav ranges across a variety of fields, Leng looks long and hard at one phase in 
the development of one sub-field.  Where Rav’s argument stands on a broad base, Leng’s case 
depends for its stability on deep foundations sunk into a narrow area.  However, her 
(unpublished) paper does permit some observations of a general sort that do not require 
mastery of research-level algebra. 
 Leng identifies several strategies in Elliott’s seminar, and we can sort them using our 
distinction between Lakatos-type methods (henceforth ‘L-methods’) and Rav-type methods 
(henceforth ‘R-methods).  The principal L-method is a variety of lemma-incorporation.  Elliott 
hopes to prove a classification theorem for a subset of C*-algebras.  He has reason to believe 
that a theorem is available based on an analogy with Von Neumann algebras and an earlier 
result due to Mortensen, which he hopes to generalise.  However, he finds that he needs certain 
lemmas in order to proceed.  He could stop the main inquiry for as long as it takes to prove 
these lemmas—but that could be a long time.  Moreover, it may turn out that the final theorem 
does not need a certain lemma.  Then time spent proving that lemma would have been wasted 
(unless it revealed some independent interest).  Instead, the lemma is temporarily added to the 
conditions of the theorem.  Thus rigour is satisfied and the main inquiry is not delayed.  Once 
the big theorem has assumed its final form, the lemmas are re-examined to see if they really are 
required and if so how they might be proved.  In Proofs and Refutations lemma-incorporation 
is prompted by actual counter-examples.  Here, temporary lemma-incorporation is practised 
simply because mathematical rigour does not permit a proof to include significant unproven 
lemmas.19 
 Like all the patterns in Proofs and Refutations, this L-method can lead to degeneration 
if pursued mindlessly.  If every difficulty is turned into an extra condition then the resulting 
theorem will be trivial.  What is more, the method can only succeed if we have some 
independent reason to think that there is a significant theorem to be had.  We need something 
to persuade us that the temporarily incorporated lemmas can be washed out once the main 
theorem has taken shape.  It might be disastrous if some lemmas turned out not to be true of the 
domain we originally hoped to describe.  These last remarks are instances of a more general 
truth: methods cannot govern themselves.  They need to be guided by the partly-articulate 
feeling for the subject-matter enjoyed by the experienced researcher.  This is true of both R- 
and L-methods.  Diagonalisation and coset-counting appear in many different proofs, but they 
must be deployed with skill and understanding.  Temporary lemma-incorporation keeps the 
inquiry on track and prevents the master-proof from becoming unmanageably large.  There is 
no hope of specifying formally what ‘on track’ and ‘manageable’ might mean.  We must rely 
on something like Polanyi’s tacit knowledge. 
In the case of C*-algebras there is a background history to inform Elliott’s judgment.  
The first attempt at a definition of a C*-algebra appeared in a 1943 paper by Soviet 
mathematicians Gelfand and Neumark.20  This definition took the form of six axioms, but they 
were not chosen arbitrarily.  The aim was to produce an abstract description of an already well-
established field of mathematical objects.  The collection of all norm-closed self-adjoint 
algebras of bounded operators on complex Hilbert spaces was already familiar to 
mathematicians and in that sense relatively concrete (encouraging note to philosophers: 
nothing hangs on the mathematical detail here).  The theory of C*-algebras began as an attempt 
to abstract the algebraically interesting features of this collection.21  This history is the context 
in which tacit judgments are made.  Such judgments are not blind guesses, nor are they 
philosophically intractable.  We are not obliged to hand them over to anthropologists of 
science for ‘naturalistic’ treatment.  Participant-observer studies such as Leng’s allow us to get 
some philosophical grip on the ‘tacit dimension’. 
 There is also, in Leng’s paper, a good example of an R-method (that is to say, a 
specifically mathematical technique).  Each C*-algebra has a family of structures associated 
with it.  In particular, each algebra has its own lattice of closed, two-sided ideals (here again, 
nothing hangs on knowing what a closed, two-sided ideal is).  There are mappings defined 
between these lattices, and sometimes these mappings turn out to be isomorphisms.  Elliott’s 
central thought (as reported by Leng) is as follows: for a special class of cases, algebras with 
isomorphic lattices are themselves isomorphic.  In other words, we can discover relationships 
between algebras by looking at relationships between the structures associated with them.  For 
a homely illustration, it is like showing that two houses with exactly the same wiring diagram 
must be the same buildings ‘up to isomorphism’ i.e. they were built from the same 
architectural plans.  Clearly this thought can be used elsewhere in mathematics.  It is, however, 
not topic-neutral.  It can only find application where we have the possibility of isomorphisms 
between objects and between their associated structures.  It is therefore an R-method. 
 Leng concludes, reasonably, that there is something Lakatosian going on in the 
development of C*-algebras, but only if we stretch our sense of ‘Lakatosian’.  There is lemma-
incorporation, but it is not prompted by counterexamples.  The story does not seem very 
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 Here I rely wholly on Leng’s exposition. 
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 These six axioms included some redundancy which was eventually (over seventeen years) weeded out—another 
case of temporary lemma incorporation. 
‘quasi-empirical’.  She notes that the story could also be told using the terms of Pickering’s 
‘dialectic of resistance and accommodation’.  Here again we have an instance of a greater 
truth: general, topic-neutral methods have to be stretched in order to fit the details of specific 
cases.  With repeated stretching they lose their characteristic shapes, and it becomes 
increasingly difficult to find a reason to prefer one to another.  Having answered her original 
question about Lakatos and advanced algebra, Leng should (in my view at least) set aside the 
question ‘which general methodology best describes mathematical practice?’ because none of 
them has more than a little insight to offer. 
David Corfield: Ends and Means 
  Leng’s work takes us inside the mathematical factory.  By itself, however, it cannot 
serve as an exemplar for a developing discipline.  It focuses so tightly on one context that we 
should need armies of philosophical infiltrators to get any sort of overview.  Moreover, having 
settled the Lakatos question, we need a fresh research strategy.  Otherwise we run the risk of 
falling into a merely descriptive exercise.  This brings me to my third and final press-ganged 
recruit to the dialectical banner. 
Like Mary Leng, David Corfield began with a question about the applicability of 
Lakatos’ vision of mathematics to the twentieth century.22  In his view, Lakatos failed to see 
that translation into a relatively formal language does not mean death for mathematics.  
Concepts may still be stretched and dialectical patterns found even in a mature field where 
spatial and empirical intuitions have given way to explicit definitions.  He has in mind such 
parts of mathematics as group-theory and algebraic topology.  In spite of their technical 
development compared with (say) school geometry, these areas are not formalised in the sense 
required by mathematical logic, where the logical language and inferential rules are explicitly 
specified in advance of special axioms describing the subject matter in view.  Thus Lakatos’ 
polemics against ‘static rationality’ and ‘formalism’ (the identification of mathematics with its 
metamathematical shadow) apply here too.  Corfield speculates that Lakatos’ failure to 
envisage dialectics in twentieth-century mathematics is part of his Hegelianism23.  He may 
have a point, since Hegelian narratives usually end with a sort of stasis.  If the final pages of 
the Phenomenology of Spirit are to be taken seriously it seems that Spirit has been hanging 
about for almost two centuries with its hands in its pockets.24  A more immediate explanation 
for Lakatos’ blindness to the dynamism of highly technical mathematics may lie in our 
distinction between topic-neutral L-methods and topic-specific R-methods.  It is plausible that 
topic-neutral methods progressively give way to topic-specific methods as a discipline matures.  
In contemporary mathematics the topic-neutral methods have almost vanished.  There will of 
course always remain the entailment relations resulting from the application of R-methods.  If 
this conjecture is true then Lakatos failed to see any dynamism in the most advanced 
mathematics because the sorts of pattern he was looking for cannot easily be found there.  It 
also follows that we should concentrate our philosophical attention on relatively topic-specific 
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 Hegel also claims that static Utopias such as Plato’s Republic are impractical because Spirit is restless (in The 
Philosophy of History—Egypt).  Presumably at the end of History Spirit is driven by this restlessness to produce 
endless variations of itself without advancing in any way.  Perhaps convinced Hegelians should worry about what 
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present at the time of writing. Hegelians can argue that the whiggish conclusion to a typical Hegelian narrative 
seems like the definitive last word because at the time of writing, it is.  No such argument is available to Lakatos. 
The story in Proofs and Refutations stops arbitrarily at Poincaré, and with little of Hegel’s crescendo.  For more 
on the relation between Lakatos and Hegel see Larvor ‘Lakatos’ Mathematical Hegelianism’ (Owl of Minerva 
Vol. 31 no. 1, Fall 1999). 
techniques.  Indeed we should adopt this strategy simply in order to draw out what is 
characteristically mathematical in mathematics. 
 Whatever the proper diagnosis for Lakatos’ blindness to the liveliness of advanced 
mathematics, Corfield is now forging a research strategy of his own.  It starts from the 
identification of mathematical ends.  Of course, the most general aim is the production of 
significant mathematical knowledge, but this formula is hardly informative.  Corfield hopes to 
study the ‘thick’25 evaluative notions of mathematical culture.  When mathematicians praise 
each other’s work they use terms like ‘beautiful’, ‘elegant’, ‘serious’ and ‘deep’.  About the 
highest praise is to say that a proof advances our understanding of some phenomenon.  This 
honorific is not handed out to just any valid proof—some proofs are valid but not insightful.  
Corfield’s project is not to try to isolate the essence of mathematical depth or beauty.  That 
would be hopeless because beautiful theorems are, no doubt, a motley collection with only a 
family resemblance to each other.  Rather the hope is to study the means by which these ends 
are achieved.  These means are what I have called topic-specific R-methods: mathematical 
techniques that can be applied more than once but are not so wide in their application that they 
become part of general logic.  Corfield also hopes to study the evaluative discourse of 
mathematicians.  When there is a dispute about the significance of a mathematical 
development, what considerations are advanced?  Which are decisive?  This part of the project 
suffers from the twin difficulties that first, mathematicians tend not to articulate their values 
with much precision and second, the evaluative documents (such as reports by referees and 
examiners) tend to be confidential.  These difficulties are not insuperable, and the growth of 
popular mathematical writing may offer an indirect solution.  We have already seen some 
journalistic interest in the notion of proof, and with it some evidence that mathematicians are 
more readily spurred into print if they feel that the public reputation of their discipline is at 
stake. 
 These few lines cannot convey the full richness of Corfield’s programme.  Indeed, he 
envisages the rise of a new discipline—a mathematical counterpart to the history and 
philosophy of science, or ‘science studies’.  This is to include psychology, anthropology and 
sociology as well as history and philosophy.  Any study that might illuminate the process of 
mathematics is to be made welcome.  The first order of business is to redress the philosophical 
neglect of twentieth century mathematics (aside from set theory and formal logic).  Corfield 
also envisages rich engagement with mathematical educationalists (who have to date found 
little of any use in the philosophy of mathematics).  It remains to be seen whether this level of 
inter-disciplinarity is sustainable.  The ‘science studies’ movement has produced mixed and 
muddled results in part because the distinctions between contributing disciplines have not 
always been properly sustained.  History and sociology, for example, produce quite different 
sorts of explanation.  Lakatos’ dynastic ambitions suggest a dialectical phenomenology of the 
sort outlined earlier that takes data from other disciplines but preserves its own distinctive 
point of view.  Moreover, the level of mathematical knowledge required means that there can 
never be very many researchers in this field.  Remember that our scholars must be both 
mathematically literate and simultaneously competent professionals in their chosen meta-
discipline (philosophy, psychology, etc.).  However, the whole enterprise is at such an 
embryonic stage that one cannot afford to carp.  It is time, rather, to consider the practicalities 
of institutional support, access to materials and the dissemination of ideas among a coherent 
body of scholars. 
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